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DO FIDUCIARY DUTIES CONTAINED
IN FEDERAL TAX LAWS EFFECTIVELY
PROMOTE NATIONAL HEALTH CARE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES?
Nina J. Crimmt
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary nonprofit hospitals are big, complicated, and
highly regulated businesses. As health providers, both acute care and
specialized hospitals1 must contend with and operate under continuous
tensions and pressures. These strains arise as a result of intertwined
external and internal factors. Among these factors is the complicated
and ever-changing world of medicine, including its ethical, moral, and
technological challenges; its research advances; and its progress in
treatments. Other components include a hospital's diverse patient
population, the patients' physical and psychological care-taking
needs, and the asymmetry of information between patients and health
care providers.2 Financial and human resource constraints, cost con-
tainment concerns, the regulatory environment, and staffing compe-
tence are additional contributing elements. These many considera-
tions have helped to shape not only public health care policies and
practices for hospitals generally, but also the policies and practices of
each particular hospital.
Every hospital's governing board, entrusted with the development
and oversight of many critical overarching hospital policies and prac-
tices, undertakes wide-ranging complex governance and corporate
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. in Taxa-
tion, Georgetown University (1982); J.D., M.B.A., Tulane University (1979); A.B.,
Washington University (1972). I wish to thank Daniel S. Strouse for his helpful
comments.
The nonprofit hospital may be independent or part of a health care system.
While virtually all acute care hospitals have emergency rooms or urgent care facili-
ties, a specialized hospital, such as an eye, ear, nose and throat hospital, may or may
not have such facilities.
2 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
866 (1980) (stating that often patients do not have the required knowledge to question
the care they receive).
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management decisions and actions.3 For each of these tasks, the gov-
erning board, both as a group and individually, stands ultimately ac-
countable for the nonprofit hospital to a broad spectrum of stake-
holders or constituents. 4 The complexity of a governing board's ac-
countability is accentuated by a common hospital governance struc-
ture, atypical of most industries in the § 501(c)(3) sector.5 Through
sharing and delegation arrangements, the institutional governance
structure vests in one of the hospital's major stakeholders, the medical
staff, the formal and informal authority over many medical policy
matters. 6 Those governance configurations and relationships poten-
3 The governing board is responsible for the formulation of the hospital's
mission and goals, as well as the strategies to accomplish them. An extremely critical
facet of the board's ultimate institutional responsibilities is the establishment and
implementation of policies and procedures that ensure health care will be provided
without ethical or moral compromise to patients. See infra note 6 and accompanying
text (commenting on the role of a hospital's medical staff over medical care policy
matters). Also, the governing board must determine strategies and adopt policies for
acquiring adequate and stable financial and human resources, ensuring the integrity of
the organization's image, creating performance effectiveness and efficiency expecta-
tions and guidelines, and monitoring and overseeing the institution's well being with
respect to finances, programs and initiatives. See BERIT M. LAKEY, NONPROFIT
GOVERNANCE: STEERING YOUR ORGANIZATION WITH AUTHORITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2000).
4 Stakeholders of nonprofit hospitals include donors; the public whose tax
dollars subsidize them through tax exemptions; patients who have a stake in services
received; and physicians, nurses and other employees who have a stake in the services
performed. For comment on the formal and informal authority of a hospital's medical
staff, see infra note 6. Additionally, the business community and employers, accredit-
ing organizations, and governmental agencies are constituents to whom the hospital is
accountable. For discussion of the stakeholders and constituents of hospitals, see
Susan Koskoff Glazer & J. Richard Gaintner, Hospital Administrators in an Era of
Change and Increasing Responsibility, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY IN HEALTH
CARE: THE NEW RESPONSIBILITY 147, 150-51 (Leona E. Markson & David B. Nash
eds., 1995).
5 While this structure can be viewed as somewhat unique to hospitals, it can
be analogized to the institutional structure present at universities where the governing
board has the final responsibility for corporate and administrative governance and the
faculty has formal and informal authority over many academic matters.
6 Typically, the allocation of responsibilities and powers is shared among
the governing board, the chief executive officer, and the medical staff, which operates
as a separate unit. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
596-97 (2d ed. 1998). The medical staff is integral to the hospital and its operations.
Its responsibilities are defined by the medical staff bylaws. The medical staff carries
out its duties through a variety of committees that focus primarily on the provision of
medical care, quality of health care, medical records, ethical issues, credentials of
staff, etc. The hospital's governing board includes representation from its medical
staff. Normally the medical staff representative will serve as a member of governing
board committees that have oversight responsibility for patient care, staffing, physi-
cian privileges, and other medical care policy matters. See GEORGE D. POZGAR &
NINA SANTUCCI POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 201-04,
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tially pose extraordinary challenges and strong support for the hospi-
tal's governing board as it fulfills its duty of ultimate responsibility
for the functioning of the hospital.7
Thus, board members' positions, decisions, actions, and stake-
holders create an extensive web of behavioral parameters: moral, so-
cial, and legal fiduciary obligations that are perhaps more complex
than those applicable to the governing body of almost any other cate-
gory of tax-exempt § 501(c)(3) organization. 8 The moral and social
fiduciary obligations are far more intangible than the legal fiduciary
duties. They arise as a result of the fiduciary position itself, regardless
of the existence or absence of specific statutes and regulations impos-
ing legal fiduciary duties. These duties of performance are informal
expectations or professional norms that internally motivate board
members to make decisions and transact hospital business with integ-
rity, honesty, trustworthiness, and in the interests of stakeholders and
constituents. 9 The obligations exist among the sitting board members
as well as between the governing board and stakeholders and constitu-
ents. As a result, each board member is accountable, and must be
responsive, to every other board member, the public, patients, medical
staff, and government and private regulators.
232, 240-44 (6th ed. 1996).
The governing board's legal responsibility for the operation of the hospital
and the provision of patient care was clarified almost forty years ago in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966). This case held that it is the hospital governing board's respon-
sibility to establish procedures and mechanisms for the medical staff to evaluate,
counsel, and where necessary, take action when an unreasonable risk of harm to a
patient arises as a result of the medical treatment given by a physician with staff privi-
leges.
7 The institutional power structure typical of nonprofit hospitals may some-
times trigger competing interests, particularly financial interests. The Internal Reve-
nue Code requires an arm's-length relationship between physicians and hospitals. See
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (forbidding private inurement in the earnings of a tax-
exempt corporation). But see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (suggesting
that it would appear that the aims of a medical staff who operate in a § 501(c)(3)
hospital environment largely would align with the provision of medical care consis-
tent with the hospital's tax-exempt mission).
8 The complex accumulation of fiduciary duties for hospital governing
bodies results from a continuously changing health care industry and the highly regu-
lated health care environment, as well as the complex web of stakeholders and con-
stituents.
9 See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L.
REV. 218, 242 (2003) (referring to Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as "in-
formal social regulations that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an inter-
nalized sense of duty, [or] because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions")).
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The collection of legal fiduciary duties is established through a
multitude of corporation, taxation, labor, and health care laws and
regulations.' As a result, board members are answerable to regulatory
officials vested with oversight authority. Depending upon the nature
of a particular decision, accountability is to one or multiple officials,
including the state attorney general, 1 the state tax commissioner,
12
local property tax authorities,' 3 the state health commissioner, 14 the
secretary of state or corporation counsel, 15 Health and Human Ser-
vices employees, 16 the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS),'7 or other government or private authority.' 8
The expansive potential array of existing fiduciary obligations and
the multiple levels of officials responsible for fiducial supervision
raises the question of whether more would be better. Because vol-
umes could be written in response to the question, this short essay is
narrowly focused on the fiduciary duties created under state nonprofit
corporation statutes and federal tax laws.
The essay concentrates first on whether the fiduciary responsibili-
ties of the governing board of a tax-exempt § 501 (c)(3) hospital under
10 Common law principles and doctrines also are involved.
I For comment on the general fiducial oversight responsibilities of attorneys
general, see infra note 36-37 and accompanying text.
12 State tax commissioners generally have oversight responsibilities for
granting and monitoring exemptions from state income and sales taxes. These state
exemptions largely follow the federal tax exemption determinations.
13 The local tax authority has oversight responsibility for granting and moni-
toring tax exemptions for property taxes.
14 State health commissioners are generally responsible for determining
whether nonprofit hospitals within their jurisdictions comply with numerous state
health laws.15 The secretary of state or corporation counsel monitors corporations' an-
nual reporting documents and supervises the issuance of articles of incorporation.
16 The Inspector General of Health and Human Services is charged with
compliance oversight of federal laws and Health and Human Services regulations
affecting health care institutions and providers, including the patient dumping laws
and the Medicare fraud and anti-kickback laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003).
Officials of the Office of Clinical Standards and Quality of the Health Care Financing
Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services have oversight
responsibility for quality and utilization standards applicable to Medicare providers.
17 For discussion of general fiducial oversight responsibilities of the commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Service, see infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
18 A hospital's governing body is responsible for satisfying accreditation
requirements. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), a private organization, is the recognized accrediting agency. Albeit not
without criticism, "in recognition of the broad acceptance of JCAHO within the hos-
pital segment, . . . under [the] Medicare statute, JCAHO accredited hospitals are
deemed to meet most requirements for Medicare certification." See BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 9-10 (2d ed. 2000).
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current federal tax laws effectively promotes national health care poli-
cies and practices. Then it considers whether expansion of the duties
imposed by federal tax statutes would further contribute to the ad-
vancement of our health care goals by promoting more publicly bene-
ficial health care policies and practices of § 501(c)(3) hospitals. This
issue is especially timely because, once again,19 Congress is debating
whether to expand the IRS's oversight role over the broad spectrum of
tax-exempt § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations and their governing
boards.20  Of particular note, Congress is considering legislation to
create a new federal fiduciary duty of care for governing boards of §
501(c)(3) organizations based on a standard similar to the one con-
tained in many state substantive nonprofit corporation statutes. 2' Re-
cent empirical evidence, however, suggests that current moral, social,
and legal fiduciary duties suffice to ensure that governing bodies of §
501(c)(3) hospitals already seriously pursue their responsibilities to
further their hospitals' charitable health care missions, and conse-
quently to advance national health care policy. 22 With respect to §
501(c)(3) hospitals, the benefit of the proposed additional federal tax
legislation is, therefore, highly questionable. As discussed below, in
search of a largely non-existent problem in the § 501(c)(3) hospital
industry, the proposed regulatory tool supplies an essentially redun-
dant remedy outside the traditional competencies of the IRS.
19 Of particular note, in 1950 and 1969 Congress enacted statutes attempting
to curtail perceived financial abuses by § 501(c)(3) organizations, especially private
foundations, which Congress distinguished as a separate § 501(c)(3) category in 1969.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 947 (1950) (enacting I.R.C. §§
502, 503, 504, and 511-514, reenacted as part of the I.R.C. of 1954); Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (enacting I.R.C. §§ 509(a), 508(e),
4940-4946). For a brief discussion, see Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private
Foundation's Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regula-
tion, 50 EMORY L. REv. 1093, 1109-23 (2001).
20 See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening
to Good Charities: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong.
(2004). 21 See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
22 Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law,
and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1345 (2003) (looking at
profitable and unprofitable services offered by for-profit, nonprofit, and government
hospitals). But see Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Who Profits from
Nonprofits?, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb.1987, at 93 (presenting an old and much
criticized study suggesting that nonprofit hospitals do not contribute to the commu-
nity sufficiently to warrant tax subsidization). For further discussion of Professor
Horwitz's empirical study, see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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PUBLIC HEALTH CARE POLICY -- MISSIONS OF
HOSPITALS
There is no one formal national public health care policy. Ex-
tracting from the rhetoric of public debate and state and federal legis-
lation, it appears that the overall vision for health care is to strive to
deploy medical resources in a rational manner in order to maximize
treatment and care benefits in the best interests of patients and to ad-
vance medical science education and innovation. To carry out this
apparent goal, the basic aims of any nonprofit or for-profit hospital are
to provide "its" patient population access to health care, and to ensure
patients' security and best interests through the delivery of ethical
medical care and quality treatment.2 3  These objectives incorporate
economic, social, and moral notions. In this regard, the more preva-
lent contemporary nonprofit hospital124 distinguishes itself from its for-
profit brethren25 by a dominant ethical, moral, or social motive,26
which plays out through a decidedly public beneficial or charitable
27purpose. The mission may be to advance health care and enhance
23 See INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 232 (2001) (defining quality as "the degree to which
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.).
24 According to the American Hospital Association, approximately 5800
hospitals exist in the United States. Of these, 4900 are community hospitals and 900
are public hospitals. HOSPITAL STATISTICS 6 (2004) available at
http://www.aha.org/ahalresourcecenter/fastfacts/fastfactsUS-hospitals.html.
About 3000 nonprofit hospitals and 1900 for-profit hospitals compose the community
hospitals. Id.
25 A for-profit hospital is organized and operated to provide medical care to
patients, but it intends to earn a profit for distribution to shareholders. Hence, in pro-
viding health care, it seeks to accomplish its profit motive through its selection of
services and treatments offered and its targeted patient population largely capable of
providing compensation for services rendered.
26 See HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS & ASSOCIATIONS 16 (6th ed. 1994). The authors
write: "[m]otive is the acid test of the right to nonprofit status, in most cases. When
altruistic, ethical, moral, or social motives are the clearly dominant ones in an enter-
prise, that enterprise is nonprofit." Id. Thus, the contemporary nonprofit hospital is
inevitably publicly beneficial or charitable.
27 State statutes do not uniformly require that a nonprofit organization be
organized and operated for charitable or other publicly beneficial purposes. Some
state statutes, such as those enacted by Massachusetts and New York, specifically
delineate acceptable publicly beneficial purposes. But see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §
5111 (West 1990 & Supp. 2004). Some state statutes, such as those enacted by Mas-
sachusetts and New York, specifically delineate acceptable publicly beneficial pur-
poses. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4(a)-(n) (West 1998); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. ACT § 201(b) (McKinney 1997). Other states are less specific and,
indeed, may specify only that the nonprofit corporation's activities must be lawful.
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service delivery through resident training programs, research initia-
tives, implementation of costly and "state of the art" medical technol-
ogy, unprofitable treatments and medical services, care of broad and
diverse patient population, including indigents, or a combination of
these.28
Because the hospital's governing board incorporates social and
ethical notions into the nonprofit hospital's mission to a greater extent
than a proprietary hospital, it struggles with a variety of additional
tensions and pressures. Although these challenges would suggest that
states' substantive nonprofit laws would employ a higher standard in
measuring whether nonprofit hospital governing boards satisfy their
legal fiduciary duties, generally this is not the case.
STATE LAWS ESTABLISHING GOVERNING BOARD'S
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN MANAGING NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS' AFFAIRS
Our federal system vests authority within the states to enact and
enforce substantive laws on the formation, operation, termination, and
other aspects of nonprofit organizations. Because essentially all non-
profit acute care and specialty hospitals are formed under state laws as
corporations rather than as trusts, 29 discussion here is confined to in-
corporated nonprofit hospitals and state laws applicable to the fiduci-
ary duties of governing boards in managing such hospitals' affairs.
During each stage of a corporation's existence - formation, opera-
tion, and termination - the governing board, as its entrusted pilot,
must make innumerable decisions on a variety of matters. Repeatedly
through the operating life of a hospital its board defines the hospital's
long- and short-range institutional goals including: the potential com-
munity of patients to serve and the types of health care service and
E.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT, § 3.01(a) (1987) (hereinafter
RAMNCA).
28 Indeed, as one scholar's recent empirical study has demonstrated, although
for-profit hospitals serve seemingly similar functions and social needs, their behaviors
are quite different. See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1366-76.
29 See ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE
ADMINISTRATION 103, 107 (2d ed. 1988). Although most nonprofit organizations
today are formed as corporations, some are organized as charitable trusts governed by
state common law.
The minimum fiduciary standards for members of governing boards of
incorporated nonprofits are more lenient than for trustees of charitable trusts. The
fiduciary duty standards of directors of nonprofit corporations have evolved to now
generally resemble those of directors of for-profit corporations. See Horwitz, supra
note 22, at 1380-81; Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L.
REv. 1400, 1426-27 (1998).
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treatment priorities; engages in strategic planning; identifies appropri-
ate allocations of financial resources to services; and ensures that hos-
pital fund balances (that is, profits) do not inure to the private benefit
or gain of any person. 30 The board and its administrative and medical
staff delegates determine procedures for hiring and evaluating per-
formance of administrators and staff personnel. The governing board
plans means of raising capital and operating funds, oversees assets
and financial dealings, and ensures compliance with all laws, regula-
tions, and accreditation standards. Perhaps one of the most important
functions of a hospital's board is its responsibility to patients, particu-
larly through its oversight of quality of care delivery standards and its
development, and delegated institutionalization, of ethical and moral
accountability initiatives. A board also may be confronted with decid-
ing whether to dissolve its nonprofit hospital. In that event, it again
confronts a range of decisions, such as the appropriate structure
(merger, consolidation, conversion to for-profit status, etc.), the
proper valuation of assets, and how to ensure dedication of hospital
31assets for acceptable charitable purposes.
Such decisions unequivocally are enormously important to the in-
stitution. As a result, most states have promulgated rules designed to
provide behavioral parameters for board members in their fiducial
decision-making roles. 32 While these fiduciary duty statutes are not
30 The "nondistribution constraint" on hospital profits is a main feature of the
nonprofit organizational structure. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. ACT § 204
(McKinney 2004). Organizing documents of the nonprofit corporation provide for
organizational adherence to the "nondistribution constraint." See MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 152 (2004). Two states,
Delaware and Kansas, do not have nonprofit corporation statutes. In those states,
hospitals are incorporated and operated under business corporation laws, but a provi-
sion in their articles of incorporation must affirm that they are not formed for private
profit and are constrained from distributing profits for private benefit. See id. at 152,
514-17. All other states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of
nonprofit corporation act. Seven states adopted the American Bar Association's
(A.B.A.'s) Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, and currently almost two dozen states
have enacted laws that essentially parallel the A.B.A.'s 1987 RMNCA. See id. at
152. The RMNCA contains a nondistribution constraint provision. RMNCA, § 13.01
(1987).
The nondistribution constraint provision does not prohibit the payment of
reasonable compensation to directors, officers, and personnel. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT CORP. ACT § 515(b) (McKinney 2004).
31 Statutes in all but four states also require that at termination of the non-
profit hospital, liquid and nonliquid assets cannot be diverted to benefit individuals.
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 30, at 319. These statutes comport with the concept
of the "nondistribution constraint" imposed on nonprofit organizations during their
operational existence. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
32 As of January 1, 2003, forty-eight states had codified some version of the
duty of loyalty and forty-three states had codified some form of the duty of care. See
[Vol. 15:125
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uniform among the states, all aim specifically to ensure directors'
adherence to the organizational mission and to protect stakeholders
and institutional well-being and security. They have the secondary
socially valuable effect of safeguarding the reputation of the nonprofit
hospital industry and the broader nonprofit sector. Legislatures,
courts, state enforcement officials, and scholars frequently categorize
the fiduciary duties broadly as duties of loyalty and care.
The duty of loyalty has two main components. The first prong is
the obligation of obedience. It requires governing board members to
fulfill the particular dictates of the nonprofit hospital's charter and to
refrain from substantial deviation from the institutional purposes
stated in its governing documents.33 In other words, there is mission
accountability. The second component is the obligation of each mem-
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 30, at 207, 218.
The New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Act is illustrative. Sections
204, 508 and 515 of the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Act permit a nonprofit
corporation to earn profits but constrain their use to maintaining, expanding, or oper-
ating the organization's lawful activities, and they otherwise prohibit distribution of
organizational profits. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 204, 508, 515 (McKin-
ney 2004). The duty of loyalty is distinctly presented in § 715, which restricts con-
flict of interest transactions and contracts between the nonprofit corporation and its
directors. Similarly, § 716 prohibits organizational loans to fiduciaries. Other provi-
sions set forth additional administrative responsibilities of governing board members,
including prudent investment decisions (§ 512), asset purchases (§ 509), and invest-
ment management delegation (§ 514). The standard by which directors are measured
in upholding their fiduciary duties is codified in § 717(a). That provision requires
that each governing body member discharge all duties in "good faith and with that
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." Id.
Some similar provisions are found in the RMNCA, which has been
adopted in numerous states. See supra note 30. In particular, § 13.01 of the RMNCA
constrains distribution of income and assets; § 8.31 imposes conflict of interest rules,
and § 8.30(a) delineates the fiduciary duty of care standard of "good faith," "care that
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances," and belief that the decision or action is "in the best interests" of the non-
profit corporation. As a general matter, the good faith and ordinary or reasonable
prudence standard subjects governing board members to personal liability for ordi-
nary negligence, the same standard applicable to directors of business corporations.
Nonetheless, some courts have held members personally liable only for gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct. Compare Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training
Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D. D.C. 1974) (holding
that trustees breached their fiduciary duties in failing to supervise the management of
the institution's investments) with Beard v. Achenbach Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n., 170 F.2d
859 (10th Cir. 1948) (holding that directors' use of corporation funds were not grossly
negligent and did not constitute a breach of their duties as fiduciaries).
33 Some scholars and courts have categorized this obligation to carry out the
charitable mission of the hospital and not to permit substantial deviation from its
charitable purposes as a separate duty of obedience. See, e.g., DANIEL L. KURTZ,
BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84-85 (1988).
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ber to deal fairly and with undivided loyalty toward the nonprofit hos-
pital. Loyalty accountability encompasses the necessity to place the
corporation's financial interest above personal interests when a con-
flict of interest arises. 4
Moreover, each governing board member must discharge all deci-
sions and actions, as well as their delegation, with due care. State laws
codify the minimum threshold standard of this duty of care. Statutes
typically require a fiduciary to exercise all retained and delegated
governance and managerial responsibilities in good faith, in the non-
profit organization's best interest, and with the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a similar position under like circumstances.35
State laws provide for monitoring of compliance and for punish-
ment in the event of noncompliance with these affirmative duties.
Authority to supervise fiduciaries' conformity with these laws and to
take action in the event of a breach commonly resides in the state at-
torney general. 36  States generally permit the attorney general to re-
dress the breach by bringing a court action against a board member to
compel an accounting for the decision or transaction, to cancel con-
34 See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1380; Brody, supra note 29, at 1427-28.
The nonprofit corporate duty of loyalty permits a director of a nonprofit corporation
to enter into transactions with the nonprofit organization as long as the personal inter-
est is fully disclosed to disinterested directors and the interested director abstains from
the decision-making process with respect to the problematic transaction. By compari-
son, if the organizational form is a trust, the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty
imposes a strict prohibition against a trustee's self-dealing in transactions where con-
flicts of interest arise, regardless of the potential financial fairness or favorableness to
the trust. See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1380-81; Brody, supra note 29, 1419-22.
The trust settlor, however, can modify this absolute prohibition in the trust instru-
ment. See id. at 1420.
35 See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.30(a). The standard of care established by state
law, either business corporation or nonprofit corporation statutes, is less stringent than
the standard of care that a trustee owes to a trust. Under trust laws, the duty of care
requires a trustee to behave with respect to the affairs of the trust as would a prudent
person dealing with his own property. See Brody, supra note 29, at 1422; Horwitz,
supra note 22, at 1381.
Pursuant to the "business judgment rule" invoked by many state courts, a
member of the board is protected from liability arising from errors in judgment if he
or she acts in good faith, with honesty, without divided loyalty, and in the decision-
making process has taken appropriate steps to be informed of the facts relevant to the
decision. See, e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. 1984);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979); Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013-
15; Achenbach Mem "l Hosp. Ass 'n, 170 F.2d at 862.
36 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 30, at 305-14. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 112, 720(b) (McKinney 1997) (delineating attorney general's
power to maintain actions and proceedings). The legal literature includes many criti-
cisms on, and explanations of, the insufficiency of monitoring and enforcement of
these laws by attorneys general. See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, Why All is Not Quiet on the
"Home Front "for Charitable Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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veyances or assignments of institutional assets, to enjoin unlawful
conveyances or assignments of organizational property, to reimburse
the corporation, and to replace the wrongdoer.37
Many board decisions and actions frequently relate to compliance
with multiple regulatory provisions beyond state substantive fiduciary
duty laws, including federal, state, or local tax laws, state and federal
solicitation statutes, state health laws, Medicare laws, and accredita-
tion rules. Consequently, another official or officials may also have
oversight responsibility. One such official is the commissioner of the
IRS, who is charged with determining nonprofit hospitals' initial and
continuous deservedness of tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3)
and with enforcing federal tax laws that contain some fiduciary duties
correlative to those described above under state statutes.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION
Almost eighty years before Congress enacted the first federal tax
exemption for charitable organizations in 1894,38 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized health care delivery as inherently charitable in na-
ture, and hospitals as eleemosynary organizations. 39 As a result, non-
profit hospitals became, and continue to be treated as, presumptively
eligible for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 40 Nonetheless,
each hospital as an entity must qualify for tax-exempt status pursuant
to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which requires the hospital, regardless of its
place of formation and operation, to be:
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, ... or educational purposes ... no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, no substantial activities of which is car-
rying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
37 See EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 549-
50 (1974). See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 719, 720 (McKinney
1997). Additionally, an attorney general can bring actions to dissolve the nonprofit
corporation or to restrain corporate activities. See, e.g., id. at § 112.
38 Tariff Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). The first federal tax exemption for corporations
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes,
no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
individual" was enacted several years later. Corporation Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38,
36 Stat. 11, 113 (1909).
39 Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 563 (1819).
40 Essentially all acute care nonprofit hospitals are tax-exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1383.
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legislation .... and which does not participate in, or intervene
in... any political campaign.4'
The focus of the statute is on the institution's mission and activi-
ties. Compliance with the statute is the responsibility of the hospital's
governing board. In that regard, the institutional activities reflect the
board's adherence to that duty. Consequently, the statute also implic-
itly functions to establish behavioral parameters for decisional and
transactional responsibilities of board members in their capacities as
fiduciaries. 42 Each board member must act unwaveringly to ensure
that the hospital maintains its § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
For purposes of this essay, the two critical criteria of the statute
are the "charitable purpose" requirement and the private inurement
prohibition.43 Central to qualification for tax exemption is the statu-
tory requirement that the hospital be "organized" and "operated" ex-
clusively for "charitable" purposes.44 The charitable purpose concept
reaches far beyond the notion that a nonprofit corporation must be
formed and operated for lawful purposes and that its profits cannot
inure to the private benefit of any individual. According to the IRS, a
"charitable" hospital must benefit the community by the promotion of
health care to a sufficiently broad population.45
41 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
42 See FREMONT-SMIT, supra note 30, at 240; John G. Simon, The Tax
Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 68, 88-89 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987). Additionally, the governing board of nonprofit hospitals has a fiduciary
duty to comply with I.R.C. § 6033 requirements for filing an information tax return.
43 This essay does not discuss additional components of the statute, namely
restrictions on political activities (campaigning and lobbying). The § 501(c)(3) statu-
tory restrictions on political activities, however, implicate the fiduciary duty of loy-
alty. If a board allows hospital representatives to engage in impermissible levels of
political activities on behalf of the hospital, even if the intention is specifically to
further the hospital's mission and goals, such actions would be illegal under §
501(c)(3). Because state laws forbid corporate charters to allow illegal acts, a board
member cannot permit such acts without breaching the duty of loyalty. No standard
of care is contained in § 501(c)(3) with respect to the political activities limitations;
however, U.S.C. § 4955, enacted in 1987 specifies the standard as one of knowledge.
I.R.C. § 4955(a)(2) (2000), added by Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, § 10712(a)
(1987).
44 If the hospital is a teaching hospital affiliated with a university and its tax-
exempt status is based on the university's educational tax exemption, then the board
must act to ensure compliance with the educational purpose permitted under §
501(c)(3).
45 The meaning of the term "charitable" for § 501(c)(3) purposes lacks preci-
sion and has always been considered to evolve with societal changes and needs. The
IRS has intentionally refrained from assigning a fixed and immutable definition. See
Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings before the
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Commentators have suggested that the implicit fiduciary obliga-
tion with respect to the charitable purpose centerpiece is the duty of
loyalty, and in particular the obligation to formulate and obey the dic-
tates of the organization's charitable charter.46 As a result of this
obligation, in crafting the hospital's particularized health care goals
and the contours of its policies and practices, the hospital governing
board cannot substantially deviate from furthering its ethical, social,
and moral responsibilities to the community in which it operates.
These concerns must be reflected in shaping the board's many specific
decisions involving the hospital's long- and short-range goals: the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 5 (1972) (Statement of Edwin S.
Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) ("We have tried to avoid
interpreting the word 'charitable' in a fixed, immutable fashion. As the courts have
done in many nontax settings, we have tried to give it a meaning that changes and
expands as the needs of society change and expand"). Nonetheless, the IRS has is-
sued several important revenue rulings informing that a "charitable hospital" requires
it to benefit the community ("community benefit standard") by the promotion of
health care to a broad population. Until Medicare and Medicaid, the community
benefit standard required a hospital to be "operated to the extent of its financial ability
for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those who
are able and expected to pay." Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. After the gov-
ernment instituted Medicare and Medicaid, Treasury revised the community benefit
standard from one based on charity care to a standard requiring a hospital to operate
an emergency room open to nonpaying patients, to possess a governing board drawn
from the general community, and to have an open (nondiscriminatory) medical staff,
and to provide nondiscriminatory treatment to Medicare and Medicaid patients. Rev.
Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. After release of Revenue Ruling 69-545, the Circuit
Court of the District of Columbia reiterated the notion that the meaning of "charita-
ble" must evolve with the "changing economic, social and technological" realities of
society. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288-90 (D.C. Cir.
1974), vacated on other grounds, Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1974). Accordingly, with the growth of ambulatory and specialized hospitals, in
1983 Treasury refined the requirements of Revenue Ruling 69-545 to permit hospitals
without emergency rooms to show that the need for emergency services was ade-
quately provided in the community. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. Revenue
Ruling 69-545, as amplified by Revenue Ruling 83-157, remains the established
community benefit standard for hospitals today. For a discussion of the community
benefit standard and its deficiencies with respect to hospitals, see Mark A. Hall &
John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative
Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307, 364-67 (1991).
In addition to the community benefit standard, public policy prohibiting
discrimination based on race or national origin has been applied to determine educa-
tional institutions' deservedness of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590-600 (1983); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150
(D.D.C 1971), aff'dsub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The law remains
unclear as to whether that public policy should be applied to other institutions, such as
hospitals, in determining their tax-exempt status.
46 See Simon, supra note 42, at 88 (citing Sharon Hooper, Systems of Fiduci-
ary Enforcement (Paper prepared for Yale Law School seminar 1985) and including
the duty of obedience as an element of the duty of loyalty).
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patient population to serve; the types of health care services and
treatment priorities to offer; the basis on which to offer services and
treatments, whether on an emergency care basis or exclusively non-
urgent care; the extent to allocate support to certain kinds of innova-
tive technology, research, or education; and the procedures and stan-
dards for hiring qualified medical staff on a nondiscriminatory basis.
4 7
Nonetheless, there is no explicit or implicit standard of care contained
in § 501(c)(3) by which to measure whether a board's behavior satis-
fies its § 501(c)(3) fiduciary duty of loyalty.48 This is where the in-
tangible duties of performance have a role.
The public, patients, medical staff, regulators, and sitting mem-
bers of the governing board hold each board member to the duties of
performance: to make decisions and transact the business of being a
charitable entity in the stakeholders' best interests with integrity, hon-
esty, and trustworthiness. These constituents have the power to judge,
and a board member's failure to satisfy them can result in non-legal
sanctions, such as stigmatization, shame, decreased esteem, loss of
prestige, and dishonor.49 Section 501(c)(3), however, does not pro-
vide authority to the commissioner of the IRS to impose tangible pun-
ishment on any board member for failure to satisfy the duties of per-
formance. Instead, § 501(c)(3) confines the commissioner's authority
to judging the institution and whether it has sufficient community
benefit attributes to retain its tax-exempt status.50
The second requirement of the § 501(c)(3) criteria is the prohibi-'
tion against private inurement (nondistribution constraint).5 Board
members are responsible for ensuring that hospital profits do not pri-
vately benefit insiders. The duty of loyalty here is apparent, but there
is no standard of care contained in the statute. As a result, until 1996
with the enactment of § 4958, the public, patients, and regulators re-
lied on the board to refrain from prohibited private distributions.
They could only hold board members to the intangible standards of
their duties of performance: integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness.
They could only punish by stigmatizing, shaming, and dishonoring the
offender. Punishment under § 501(c)(3) for a governing board's dis-
47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the community
benefit standard).
48 See Simon, supra note 42, at 88.
49 See Fishman, supra note 9, at 244; Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cor-
porate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1257 (1999).
'0 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
51 Almost a quarter of a century ago, the scholar Henry Hansmann labeled
the § 501(c)(3) private inurement restriction as the "nondistribution constraint."
Hansmann, supra note 2, at 838.
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loyalty by failing to ensure satisfaction of the private inurement re-
quirement was confined to an IRS revocation of the hospital's §
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.52
The severity of revoking the institution's tax exemption, the rem-
edy's failure to deter and punish the responsible wrongdoers, and con-
sequently the commissioner's hesitancy to impose the remedy, led
Congress to enact the I.R.C. § 4958 "intermediate sanctions. 53 Con-
gress intended these monetary sanctions, in the form of excise taxes,
as a means to punish the actual offenders for relatively minor or iso-
lated incidents of transactions resulting in impermissible financial
private benefit to certain parties.54 The statute targets two categories
of wrongdoers: the individual who allows the impermissible excess
benefit to occur ("managers," including board members) 55 and the
party impermissibly benefited ("disqualified person"). A "disquali-
fied person" includes a person in a position to exercise "substantial
52 A breach of loyalty could lead to an action for personal liability under the
state fiduciary duty of obedience, loyalty, and care statutes. See supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text discussing the state fiduciary duty statutes. Breach of state
fiduciary duties can result from a board member's behavior that jeopardizes a non-
profit hospital's tax-exempt status under federal, state, or local tax laws. See JAMES J.
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
152 (1995) (discussing the six basic functions of board members), citing WILLIAM G.
BOWEN, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM: GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEES 18-20
(1994). The state attorney general typically would be the party to bring an action
against the offending board member. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. ACT §
720(a) (McKinney 1997).
" I.R.C. § 4958 (1996). Prior to enactment of § 4958, Congress had not
envisioned the IRS as a significant overseer of public charities' governing bodies'
fiduciary responsibilities and behavior. Yet, Congress previously had intended the
IRS to perform this role with respect to private foundations' management. See I.R.C.
§§ 4941-4945 (2000).
54 Since enactment of § 4958, questions have been raised as to when the IRS
will utilize that provision as the only sanction, when it will pursue revocation of tax-
exempt status, and when it might undertake both. The Treasury indicated in the Pre-
amble to temporary regulations, which preceded the § 4958 final regulations, that it
will publish guidance as to when excess benefit transactions will rise to the level of
necessitating revocation of the tax-exempt status of the organization. T.D. 8920,
2001-1 C.B. 654. Although the Preamble listed four general factors that would be
considered, the IRS intends to provide more detailed guidance, in part based on ex-
perience that it gains as it administers § 4958. The only Tax Court case to date decid-
ing § 4958 issues is Caracci v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379 (2002) (ruling that each
of the disqualified persons was jointly and severally liable for the excise taxes under §
4958 due to the excess benefits resulting from an asset transfer). The IRS is currently
working on its project to give guidance. See Fred Stokeld, Guidance to Address
Revocation, Excise Taxes, Says IRS Official, 104 TAx NOTES 470 (2004).
55 Members of the governing body are organizational managers for purposes
of the statute. I.R.C. § 4958(f(2) (2000).
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influence" over the affairs of the § 501(c)(3) organization,56 such as a
member of the governing board, officers, or their delegates.
Section 4958 specifies a standard by which the IRS can judge
whether a board member has satisfied his fiduciary responsibilities to
the hospital in his decision-making processes. It is based on the board
member's "knowing participation"5 7 in approving a transaction that
economically produces "excess benefits" '58 to any disqualified person.
Therefore, if a board member knowingly approves a transaction that
results in financial self-dealing or in other private inurement to him-
self, another board member, or other insider, he breaches a § 4958
statutory duty of loyalty to the hospital. 59
56 The statutory definition of "disqualified persons" includes (1) persons in a
position to have "substantial influence over the organization's affairs, (2) family
members of persons in positions of "substantial influence" over the affairs of the
organization, and (3) entities that are thirty-five percent controlled directly or indi-
rectly by all such persons. I.R.C. § 4958 (f)(1)(2000). Per Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-
3(c)(l)-3(g) (2002), Ex. 3, individuals on the governing body entitled to vote on or-
ganizational matters are considered per se to have "substantial influence" over the
organization's affairs. Section 4958 applies to both § 501(c)(3) public charities and §
501(c)(4) organizations. I.R.C. § 4958 (e)(1) precludes application to private founda-
tions, where the self-dealing rules of I.R.C. § 4941 apply.
57 Knowing participation requires three criteria and includes affirmative
action, silence, or inaction where there is a duty to speak or act. Treas. Reg. §
53.4958-1(d)(3) (2002). According to the Treasury regulations, knowing participa-
tion results if the individual (1) has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that the
transaction would be an impermissible "excess benefit" transaction based only on
those facts; (2) is aware that the transaction may violate § 4958, and (3) either negli-
gently fails to reasonably attempt to determine if the transaction is an impermissible
"excess benefit" transaction or is actually aware that it is such an impermissible "ex-
cess benefit" transaction. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(4) (2002). See infra note 58 for
a definition of an "excess benefit" transaction.
58 An "excess benefit transaction" is one in which the economic benefit
provided directly or indirectly by an applicable exempt organization to or for the use
of a "disqualified person" exceeds the consideration received by the tax-exempt or-
ganization in the transaction. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-
4(a)(1) (2002).
59 Separate excise taxes may be imposed on a disqualified person and on
each participating organization manager under I.R.C. § 4958(a). With respect to an
organization manager, an excise tax of ten percent of the excess benefit amount may
be imposed, up to a limit of $10,000 per excess benefit transaction. I.R.C. §
4958(a)(2), (d) (2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(d)(7), (8) (2002). Two tiers of
excise taxes may be imposed on a disqualified person who has entered into an excess
benefit transaction. A disqualified person is first subject to a tax of 25% of the excess
benefit, and if not corrected timely, a 200% excise tax can be imposed on the uncor-
rected portion of the excess benefit. I.R.C. §§ 4958(a)(1), (b), (0(6) (2002); Treas.
Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(c)(1)-1(c)(2)(i) (2002).
Now, for the same transgression, a wrongdoer might become personally
liable for infractions of both state statutes and federal tax law. A board member's
decision to permit an "excess benefit" transaction is also a decision that commonly
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Currently there are few federal tax statutes that impose intermedi-
ate sanctions on board members of a § 501(c)(3) "public charity,"
including a hospital, who breach fiduciary duties other than the duty
to loyally prohibit private inurement. 60 The commissioner of the IRS
has no recourse directly against a board member who is otherwise
financially disloyal, fails to appropriately pursue the charitable goals
and mission, or is deficient in devising plans to ensure quality services
in the best interest of beneficiaries.
While the media has reported scandals in the nonprofit sector per-
taining to governing boards' breaches of fiduciary duties, the vast
majority has been for financial self-dealing and private inurement
rather than for non-financial deficiencies, such as failures to define
short and long range institutional goals in order to carry out or move
the charitable mission of the organization forward.6' Indeed, drawing
on newspaper reports of scandals in charities between 1995 and 2002,
scholar Marion Fremont-Smith's recent empirical study revealed that
of a total of fifty-four reported instances of breaches of fiduciary du-
ties by governing board members and corporate officers, only five
involved a failure to carry out the organization's charitable mission.62
In each of those five cases, officers, and not board members, of the
charitable organization failed to pursue charitable activities with gov-
ernment funds provided by the Department of Housing and Urban
63Development. Not one case of breach of loyalty for failure to carry
out the organization's charitable purpose involved a hospital. 64 There-
violates state statutory fiduciary duties of loyalty, obedience, and care. While the
standard and punishment under the federal tax statute are uniform and jurisdiction to
punish attaches regardless of the offender's domestic location, the standard and power
to punish a wrongdoer and the remedy under state fiduciary laws depend on the state.
60 Section 4955 provides excise taxes on managers who knowingly and will-
fully permit the § 501(c)(3) organization to expend funds for participation or interven-
tion in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate for public office. I.R.C. § 4955
(2000).
61 See Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing By Officers
and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REv. 25, 25 (2003) (identifying "152 incidents involving civil or criminal
wrongdoing, with six of them in both categories ... 104 that involved criminal activ-
ity, and fifty-four involved breaches of the duties of loyalty and care - self-dealing,
failing to carry out the mission of the charity, and negligent management of assets.").
62 id.
63 Id.
64 Five cases involved a hospital or hospital foundation. All five of those
concerned misuse of funds by officers, such as corporate president or executive direc-
tor, and not by a board member. Some of the cases involved criminal misappropria-
tion of funds, including charges of theft, fraud, and money laundering. The one case
reported as involving an operating hospital concerned the president of Logan General
Hospital in West Virginia. He was charged with diverting hospital funds for a failed
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fore, with respect specifically to § 501(c)(3) hospitals, should there be
concern that governing boards are failing to adequately and appropri-
ately define and pursue the hospitals' charitable purposes? The ques-
tion becomes, should Congress provide the IRS with authority to hold
fiduciaries personally liable for such failures?
DO FIDUCIARY DUTIES CONTAINED IN FEDERAL
TAX LAWS EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE NATIONAL
HEALTH CARE POLICIES AND PRACTICES?
The fact that the commissioner of the IRS lacks plenary power
over hospital board members to regulate their fiduciary behavior may
not be especially troubling. A recent empirical study by Professor Jill
R. Horwitz supports the notion that nonprofit hospitals' governing
boards make health care policy and practice decisions that do advance
their hospitals' charitable health care missions.65 After dismissing as
too narrow the much touted "uncompensated" patient care financial
measure of community benefit, 66 Professor Horwitz examines the
for-profit hospital venture, as well as fraud, money laundering, and failure to withhold
payroll taxes. See id. at 4 1.
65 Horwitz, supra note 22. Professor Horwitz also found that, consistent with
"the theory that government hospitals are hospitals of last resort," they generally
provide more unprofitable health care services to indigent and underinsured patients
than nonprofit hospitals. Id. at 1364.
6 Several years ago, I suggested that an evolving health care world calls for
a broader interpretation of the meaning of "charitable" for § 501(c)(3) exemption
purposes than "charity" care or "uncompensated" medical care, the "community
benefit" standard on which the IRS, courts, and some commentators concentrate.
Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit
Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37
B.C. L. REv. 1 (1995). See supra note 45 (discussing the "community benefit" stan-
dard. Although I believe that narrow vision of community benefit is misplaced, re-
cently a number of class action cases have been filed claiming that named hospitals
do not deserve § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for lack of providing "uncompensated
care." See Fred Stokeld, More Nonprofit Hospitals Sued, 104 TAX NOTES 902 (2004)
(reporting on forty-four class action lawsuits in twenty-three states claiming that the
hospitals failed to fulfill their obligations to provide charity care under § 501(c)(3)).
For further discussion of non-profit hospital class action litigation and a collection of
current cases, see http://www.nfplitigation.com.
The empirical literature has utilized strikingly different definitions of
"uncompensated" care. Some studies include only care provided to poor and unin-
sured patients, while numerous studies also count care given to insured patients for
which the charges eventually prove to be uncollectible bad debt. See, e.g., Frank
Sloan, Not-for-Profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior, in 1B HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH ECON. 1141 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds. 2000) (typically
defining uncompensated care as the sum of charity care and bad debt); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE NEED FOR BETTER STANDARDS
FOR TAX EXEMPTION, H.R. Doc. No. 90-84, at 2 (1990), reprinted in MEDICARE &
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types of medical treatments and services offered by hospitals. In
particular, Professor Horwitz finds that nonprofit hospitals, virtually
all tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3), generally offer more unprofitable
services to patients than equivalent proprietary hospitals. She asserts
that the difference in "hospital purposes likely drive these results. 67
Consistent with Professor Horwitz's assertion and the logical ex-
tension of her findings is the notion that the nonprofit hospitals' gov-
erning boards are consciously piloting the hospitals to satisfy the dic-
tates of their hospitals' charitable charters and to comply with the
68
nondistribution constraint. One can speculate that, at least in part,
the governing board's efforts result from the special institutional gov-
ernance structure of § 501(c)(3) hospitals.69 As a result of that struc-
ture of shared and delegated authority, the medical staff can present
challenges to the governing board where provoked by behavior per-
ceived as exceeding acceptable power boundaries and by acts of fi-
nancially entrepreneurial physicians who must be restrained from
usurping control of the hospital. 70 Nonetheless, even while guarding
MEDICAID GUIDE 38,608; Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statistical
Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 16 (Frank
A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986). Thus, dependable industry-wide comparative data on the
extent of indigent care provided by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals is difficult to
attain. Reliance on "uncompensated" care as the primary measure of community
benefit is inappropriate for other reasons. The amount of "uncompensated" care can
vary depending upon the location of a hospital, including its proximity to a govern-
ment hospital, its urban or rural setting, etc. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New
Look at Nonprofits: Health Care Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313,
337 (1986). Moreover, many other factors can impact the amount of "uncompen-
sated" care that a hospital is willing and able to provide, such as a hospital's commit-
ment to financially support its community educational function, its resident program,
its acquisition of state-of-the-art technology, its research, and other functions benefi-
cial to the community.
Professor Horwitz suggests, and I agree, that providing emergency room
or other care to the indigent "should not be the sole, or even the primary, measure" of
community benefit. Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1358. She points out that emergency
room treatment may not be the "best method, or even a good method, of making and
keeping people healthy." Id. That would be a goal to which our nation's health care
policy should aspire! Certainly, it is accessibility to quality medical care that is im-
portant. 67 Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1376.
68 Professor Evelyn Brody suggested that the nondistribution constraint is
unnecessary for remedying the asymmetric informational position of patients. Evelyn
Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and
For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 463-65 (1996). The
restriction is important, however, to ensure that governing boards dedicate organiza-
tional assets to further the exempt mission.
69 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
70 To comport with § 501 (c)(3), the IRS takes the position that the physicians
must maintain an arm's-length relationship with the hospital so that the charitable
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its authority and prerogatives over medical care policy matters, the
medical staff may actually be an active and cooperative force that
facilitates the governing board's decision-making and transactional
processes of shaping and pursuing the hospital's health care mission.7'
The medical staff's presence also might serve as a mechanism to trig-
ger the attention of the governing board to its moral and social fiduci-
ary duties of performance.
Moreover, it is plausible, but unproved, that the governing board's
conscious effort is motivated partially by the federal tax laws' fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty. It is a difficult, if not an improbable, task to dis-
cern the extent to which the fiduciary duties under federal tax laws, as
separate from those under state nonprofit laws, influence decision-
making processes of hospital board members. In other words, do the
fiduciary responsibilities that result under federal tax laws add value
that promotes nonprofit hospital boards' efforts to construct policies
and achieve practices that advance "charitable" health care purposes
in alignment with national health care goals? Perhaps the answer lies
in an empirical study constructed to compare decision-making pat-
terns of hospital board members in the states whose laws do not con-
tain a nondistribution constraint or a public or community benefit pur-
pose requirement with boards' behavioral patterns in the states that
expressly embrace the requisites.72 Absent such a study, the question
remains unanswered.
At this point what is important is that typically § 501(c)(3) hospi-
tal boards take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously. If the out-
comes of Professor Horwitz's study can be used as a measure of the
behavior of nonprofit hospital boards, § 501(c)(3) hospital boards do
further the basic goals of public health care policy by aggressively
pursuing achievement of their hospitals' decidedly public beneficial
goals and purposes.
organization does not serve their private interests. See, e.g., THOMAS K. HYATT &
BRUCE R. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 325-39,
401-02 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
71 Perhaps today with physicians' awareness of the tax-exempt rules, fewer
financially entrepreneurially inclined physicians join the medical staff of a §
501(c)(3) hospital. In that event, a medical staff who affirmatively chooses to operate
and carry out its functions in the § 501(c)(3) hospital environment likely has medical
care interests and goals largely aligned with the board-determined hospital goal and
priorities. (The alignment should result from the fact that the physicians affirmatively
have sought practice privileges with the knowledge that the hospital is a § 501(c)(3)
organization. That is not to say that there may not be financial tensions and fric-
tions.).
72 It would be logical that the state nonprofit corporation laws, which are
founded upon the same charitable notions and common law of charitable trusts as
those on which § 50 1(c)(3) is based, would generate the same or similar results.
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This result is particularly significant now that Congress is debat-
ing again the oversight role that the IRS should have over charitable
organizations.73 In its June 22, 2004, White Paper,74 the staff of the
Senate Finance Committee proposed legislative reformation to expand
the IRS's authority over governance processes of the broad spectrum
of § 501(c)(3) organizations' governing boards. 75 The White Paper
fails to distinguish between highly-regulated industries, such as hospi-
tals, and less regulated industries, such as soup kitchens or museums.
Consequently, without adequate consideration, it proposes to burden
all industries equally with more regulation, regardless of whether a
particular industry lacks or engenders serious need of a specific regu-
latory constraint or whether a proposed provision is essentially dupli-
cative of existing laws now administered by the states.
Of particular note for this essay, the White Paper proposes legisla-
tion to create a federal duty of care based on a standard similar to the
one contained in many states' nonprofit corporation statutes.76 The
73 See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening
to Good Charities: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., supra note 20. See
also supra note 19 (discussing prior periods of Congressional debate of the proper
IRS oversight role over charitable organizations).
74 Tax Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff Discussion Draft of the Senate
Committee on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].
75 Among the White Paper proposals, IRS oversight of an accreditation pro-
gram for charitable organizations, five-year reviews of a § 501(c)(3) organization's
deservedness of tax-exempt status, and control over the composition of § 501(c)(3)
organizations' governing boards. Id. at 1, 12-14. The White Paper further suggests
legislative reformation to add stricter rules against self-dealing similar to those ap-
plied to private foundations, including imposition of excise taxes on offenders. Id. at
3-4. It also proposes legislation to propose certain good governance practices. Id. at
8, 12-14. Some of these good governance practices are duplicative or weaker than
those to which some public charities currently voluntarily abide as prescribed by
various watchdog organizations or as proposed by state legislatures. For a summary
of and citation references to such alternatives, see Michael Anft & Grant Williams,
Redefining Good Governance: Charities Make Big Changes to Improve Accountabil-
ity, CHRON. PHILAN., at 6, Aug. 19, 2004; Michael Anft & Grant Williams, States
Propose New Accountability Regulations for Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. PHILAN. 8
(Aug. 19, 2004); Michael Anft & Grant Williams, Nonprofit Accountability and Fed-
eral Law: Sources ofInformation, CHRON. PHiLAN. 10 (Aug. 19, 2004); Rachel Emma
Silverman, Charities Start to Grade Themselves, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2004, at DI.
Of special note for hospitals, the White Paper proposes the development of
standards for review by state and federal authorities of conversions from the nonprofit
corporate form to the for-profit corporate form, more stringent self-dealing and excess
benefit transaction rules with respect to severance arrangements, and completion of
conversion conditioned upon IRS approval. White Paper, supra note 74 at 7.
76 White Paper, supra note 74 at 12. This proposal appears to amount to a
backhand way of signaling that states are not effectively enforcing the fiduciary duty
of care. See supra note 36 (commenting that critics have suggested that state attor-
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proposed provision would require each board member to perform re-
sponsibilities in "good faith; with the care an ordinarily prudent per-
son in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the mission, goals, and purposes of the corporation., 77  Board
members with special skills or expertise would be held to a duty to
utilize those skills or that expertise.78 Federal liability would be im-
posed personally upon any board member who breaches the duty of
care.
79
In her testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Professor
Evelyn Brody wisely asserted that any legislative reforms should be
confined to enhancing the IRS's ability to manage and enforce the
tax-exemption regime.8° Indeed, the primary business and expertise
of the IRS is the collection of tax revenues and administration of the
rules regarding tax-exempt organizations. Until eight years ago with
the addition of I.R.C. § 4958, Congress had empowered the IRS in
administering laws and regulations affecting § 501(c)(3) public chari-
ties to focus predominantly on the entity and not on the decision-
making and transactional processes of the institution's governing
board members. To extend the IRS's administration beyond its main
competence may be not only inefficient but also an improvident use of
its acknowledged deficient and overburdened compliance-monitoring
resources.
8
'
Moreover, Congress should be mindful that the role of the IRS in
administering a federal duty of care similar to the standard contained
in state fiduciary laws could be wastefully duplicative of the role of
attorneys general in enforcing their state statutes. 82 If weak monitor-
neys general are ineffective in enforcement of laws applicable to nonprofit organiza-
tions).
77 White Paper, supra note 74 at 12
78 id.
79 id.
80 Law Professor Presents White Paper on Charity Oversight, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 26, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 143-92.
81 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF
CHARITIES, at 2 (2002) [hereinafter Oversight Report] (discussing deficiencies in the
IRS oversight of charitable organizations).
The fact that only one case, Caracci v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379
(2002), involving § 4958 has been brought before the federal courts since the provi-
sion's 1996 enactment might be one indicator that creation of a federal duty of care
and personal liability provision could prove a thriftless regulatory addition.
82 The fiduciary duties resulting under state statutes and federal tax statutes
overlap already. Both state attorneys general and the commissioner of the IRS can
monitor and investigate charges of improper activities. But their primary focuses are
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ing and enforcement by state attorneys general is the problem that
Congress would seek to remedy by creating a new federally punish-
able duty of care, 83 it should rethink the approach. In this regard, the
staff of the Senate Finance Committee more appropriately proposes to
provide funding to states for oversight of tax-exempt organizations
8 4
and to empower the IRS to more readily share information with state
attorneys general.85
At this time, particularly as the nonprofit sector attempts to im-
prove its reputation and image by voluntarily increasing self-
regulation, 86 it may not be advantageous for Congress to further bur-
den the IRS with regulating decision-making and transactional proc-
esses of public charities' governing boards.87 At least in the §
501(c)(3) hospital segment, the evidence indicates that governing
boards do carry out their responsibilities to further their hospitals'
charitable purposes. Where hospitals' charitable missions are prop-
erly pursued by governing boards' conscious efforts, board members
do shape hospital policies and practices compatibly with a large part
of our overall public health care policy goals of striving to deploy
medical resources in a rational manner in order to maximize treatment
and care benefits in the best interests of patients and to advance medi-
cal education and innovation. Congress needs sounder rationales and
firmer evidence of necessity before supporting an increased role for
the IRS in this area, especially as applied to governing boards of §
501(c)(3) hospitals.
different. The commissioner of the IRS now primarily considers institutional activi-
ties (those products of fiduciary behaviors) for purposes of institutional qualification
for tax-exempt status. State attorneys general are concerned with fiduciaries' behav-
iors and the overall institutional product of that behavior.
83 See Oversight Report, supra note 81, at 26-31 (criticizing the IRS's lack of
sharing of information with states attorney general).
84 White Paper, supra note 74, at 15. One might quibble, however, with the
adequacy of the proposed amount of funding.
I d. at 16. Currently, I.R.C. § 6104(c) substantially restricts the IRS's abil-
ity to share information with the state attorneys general. For example, the IRS cannot
share information with state authorities as a federal income tax exemption qualifica-
tion investigation proceeds.
86 See Rachel Emma Silverman, Charities Start to Grade Themselves, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2004, at DI (reporting public charities concerned about image are
voluntarily adopting good governance accountability standards and programs).87 The costs associated with additional regulation may not result in sufficient
added benefit to warrant the new rules. See generally RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 6-7, 94-97 (1995) (questioning the utility of increasing
regulatory structures and cost/benefit analysis).
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